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Lots of books, research articles and editorials focusing upon the need for good 
relations between India and Pakistan have been written, but the two South Asian, 
nuclear-armed neighbors are still adamantly hostile to each other. The root cause 
of their conflict is their claim and counter claim to the entire region of Jammu and 
Kashmir. They have even fought three full wars, one limited war and a series of 
proxy wars but are yet to resolve this issue. No formal or informal talks between 
India and Pakistan can be concluded without raising the subject of ‘Kashmir’. 
Thinking rationally, one feels that the two countries, for the time being, should 
put this issue into political cold storage and focus on other bilateral conflicts 
between them. In the event they resolve those issues they could apply the same 
mechanism and methods to address Kashmir. Ashutosh Misra’s work is a step in 
that direction. Unlike others, he has tried to cautiously avoid the Kashmir issue 
and focuses upon the negotiations and dialogue process over resolved and non-
resolved conflicts between India and Pakistan.  
 
Leaving aside a detailed analysis of the Kashmir question, the author has talked 
about the Indus Water Treaty (IWT) of 1960, the Siachin dispute, the Sir Creek 
dispute, the Rann of Kutch and the Tulbul/ Wular barrage. On the basis of his 
research, Misra has described the conflict between the two as an “enduring 
conflict,” a term used by many, including T.V. Paul, to describe India-Pakistan 
dispute. But despite such disagreements, on certain issues both countries follow 
the defensive neo-realist dictum that even traditional rivals cooperate if they find 
that cooperation is in their mutual interest. The Indus Water Treaty of 1960 is one 
such example. 
 
The author has taken into account the theoretical aspects of negotiations, and talks 
about how negotiations proceed, about ripeness of the dispute, pre-negotiations, 
negotiation and agreement. India and Pakistan have followed this process but the 
relationship is so delicate and complex that one untoward incident negates all the 
hard work done by an individual or group of individuals. Mr. Vajpayee’s and 
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Nawaz Sharif’s intentions were mowed down by the Kargil episode, then Dr. 
Manmohan Singh’s and Pervez Musharraf’s step forward faltered due to Mumbai 
carnage. Once these types of incidents take place the relationship goes back to 
zero and for any further political engagement one has to start from scratch. There 
is an absolute lack of continuity in bilateral dialogue, which is a must for 
resolution of any ensuing conflict. 
 
Talking about the Confidence Building Measures (CBMs), the author is correct to 
argue that they are just short term arrangements. People sometimes become 
hysterical and start expecting the unexpected, but in the end, these arrangements 
end up nowhere and come to an abrupt end. Many CBMs and treaties to 
encourage people-to-people contacts and increasing trade have been signed, but 
they have failed to add even a spoonful of sugar to their bitter relationship. But 
two important CBMs have been honestly carried out—the Indo-Pakistan 
agreement to not attack each others’ nuclear installations and the exchange of 
nuclear lists on the first of January each year. One of the major reasons for the 
failure of other CBMs is that the government elite and private sector elite from 
both countries want the relationship to remain, so that their self-interests can be 
properly served.  
 
Referring to the previously-mentioned Indus Water Treaty (IWT) of 1960, Misra 
has given a detailed analysis and description of the treaty and the problems 
cropping up now. In an abruptly concluded chapter, citing B.G.Varghese, he has 
supported the idea of having a new treaty—Indus-II. But it must be kept in mind 
that it’s not possible for the two countries to sit together for such a long period 
and re-negotiate the entire water-sharing treaty. A few clauses of the IWT may be 
amended but the treaty, as a whole, must be kept intact. Like the IWT, the 
boundary issue in Rann of Kutch was resolved through arbitration in 1968. 
 
Problematic areas between India and Pakistan continue to be Siachin, Sir Creek 
and the Tulbul/Wular barrage. Though talks have taken place to resolve these 
conflicts, they have not been fruitful. Manning and maintaining posts at Siachin 
glacier is responsible for large number of peacetime casualties. It also puts extra 
stress on the already burdened defense budget because a lot of money is spent by 
both countries to maintain their strategic posts at Siachin. But still the two sides 
are not ready to withdraw from there and declare it a no man’s land. Many rounds 
of talks have been held to discuss the issue but were of no use. Sir Creek is a 
marshy land and is a storehouse of hydrocarbon materials. According to 
UNCLOAS it was to be declared as international water by 2009 in case India and 
Pakistan did not agree to resolve the issue, but the United Nations still has not 
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taken any action regarding its status. The Tulbul/Wular project over the river 
Jhelum is a cause of tension between India and Pakistan too. Talks have been held 
to resolve differences over this project but those talks are yet to yield any result. 
Kishenganga, another controversial run–of-river hydroelectric project, was 
referred to arbitration court in April 2010. 
 
It’s not that these above mentioned problems cannot be resolved between the two 
countries, rather they could be, if there is a strong political will among the 
powerful elites to do so, otherwise the world is going to witness more decades of 
political tension between India and Pakistan.  
 
Islamic terror groups were raised and trained by the Pakistani army to fight the 
USA’s war against the former USSR in Afghanistan. Once the US’s interest was 
served those groups were orphaned. Later on they were directed by the Pakistani 
government to fight Pakistan’s low intensity proxy war against India, in Jammu 
and Kashmir. Now, like the Frankenstein monster, these groups are ready to 
engulf even Pakistan and are a worry for global security. They are responsible for 
carrying out many bomb blasts in major Indian cities, but the author has not taken 
note of the involvement of Indian Mujahidin and Hindu terror groups, which 
makes for an egregious disparity. Indian Mujahidin came into action after post-
Godhra mayhem while Hindu extremist groups were formed in response to the 
Islamic groups. The Samjhauta Express bomb blast and the Mecca Masjid blast, 
among others, were carried out by the newly emerged Hindu terror groups. 
 
In a few places the author has also made factual mistakes. He has written that 
“meetings of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh with General Musharraf in 
Islamabad” (22), whereas as Prime Minister, Dr. Singh has yet to pay a visit to 
Pakistan. In places he has cited an incorrect date, for example the meeting of 
former Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee with General Musharraf in 2006 
(39), whereas Dr. Manmohan Singh has been India’s Prime Minister since 2004. 
The author, like many, has used the term Indo-China (several wars involving 
Indo-China between the 1950s and the 1990s) for the Sino-India war of 1962 (96). 
 
Despite the occasional oversight, this book has carefully looked into the often 
neglected issues between India and Pakistan. The author has done good work to 
make readers aware of the multiple reasons why the India and Pakistan peace 
process negotiations have failed. 
 
 
 
90
